Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware 10262

Kaspersky Lab has been assisting with incident response efforts. While investigating a cryptocurrency exchange attacked by Lazarus, we made an unexpected discovery. The victim had been infected with the help of a trojanized cryptocurrency trading application, which had been recommended to the company over email. It turned out that an unsuspecting employee of the company had willingly downloaded a third-party application from a legitimate looking website and their computer had been infected with malware known as Fallchill, an old tool that Lazarus has recently switched back to. There have been multiple reports on the reappearance of Fallchill, including one from US-CERT.

To ensure that the OS platform was not an obstacle to infecting targets, it seems the attackers went the extra mile and developed malware for other platforms, including for macOS. A version for Linux is apparently coming soon, according to the website. It’s probably the first time we see this APT group using malware for macOS.

The fact that the Lazarus group has expanded its list of targeted operating systems should be a wake-up call for users of non-Windows platforms.

Trojanized cryptocurrency trading application

Thanks to Kaspersky Lab’s malicious-behavior detection technology, implemented in its endpoint security software, we were able to reassemble the stages of infection and trace them back to their origin. This helped us understand that one of Lazarus’ victims was infected with malware after installing a cryptocurrency trading program. We also confirmed that the user installed this program via a download link delivered over email.

Trojanized trading application for Windows

Including malicious code into distributed software and putting that on a website would be too obvious. Instead, the attackers went for a more elaborate scheme: the trojan code was pushed out in the form of an update for a trading application.

A legitimate-looking application called Celas Trade Pro from Celas Limited showed no signs of malicious behaviour and looked genuine. This application is an all-in-one style cryptocurrency trading program developed by Celas.

Screenshot of Celas Trade Pro

When we started this research, any user could download the trading application from the Celas website. Checking the installation package downloaded from the website confirmed the presence of a very suspicious updater.

Installation package download page

We have analyzed the following Windows version of the installation package:

MD5: 9e740241ca2acdc79f30ad2c3f50990a
File name: celastradepro_win_installer_1.00.00.msi
File type: MSI installer
Creation time: 2018-06-29 01:16:00 UTC

At the end of the installation process, the installer immediately runs the Updater.exe module with the “CheckUpdate” parameter. This file looks like a regular tool and most likely will not arouse the suspicion of system administrators. After all, it even contains a valid digital signature, which belongs to the same vendor. But the devil is in the detail, as usual.

The code writer developed this project under the codename “jeus”, which was discovered in a PDB path included in the updater and used as unique HTTP multipart message data separator string. Because of this, and the fact that the attacked platforms include Apple macOS, we decided to call this Operation AppleJeus.

Properties of the shady updater tool included in the package are:

MD5: b054a7382adf6b774b15f52d971f3799
File Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Known file name: %Program Files%\CelasTradePro\Updater.exe
Link Time: 2018-06-15 10:56:27 UTC
Build path: Z:\jeus\downloader\downloader_exe_vs2010\Release\dloader.pdb

The main purpose of Updater.exe is to collect the victim’s host information and send it back to the server. Upon launch, the malware creates a unique string with the format string template “%09d-%05d” based on random values, which is used as a unique identifier of the infected host. This malware collects process lists, excluding “[System Process]” and “System” processes and gets the exact OS version from the registry value at “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion”. It seems that such values only exist from Windows 10, so we assume that the author developed and tested it on Windows 10.

  • ProductName: Windows OS version
  • CurrentBuildNumber: Windows 10 build version
  • ReleaseID: Windows 10 version information
  • UBR: Sub version of Windows 10 build
  • BuildBranch: Windows 10 build branch information

The code encrypts the collected information with the hardcoded XOR key (“Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y“) before uploading it to the server.

Data encryption routine

The code sends the victim’s information to a webserver using HTTP and the following URL:
www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

The server is a legitimate looking website owned by the developer of the program: Celas LLC. At this point we were not able to conclude with high confidence whether the server was compromised by the threat actor or had belonged to the threat actor from the beginning. To learn more about the server, please read the “Infrastructure” section below.

The malware used a hardcoded User-Agent string “Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)” and fixed a multipart form data separator string “jeus“.

Using encryption, the custom separator string wouldn’t be a red flag for a legitimate application, but sending a request with the context-irrelevant string “get_config”, as well as uploading collected system information as “temp.gif”, mimicking a GIF image with a magic number in the header, definitely made us raise our eyebrows.

Communication with the C2 server

After successfully uploading data, the updater checks the server response. If the server responds with HTTP code 300, it means the updater should keep quiet and take no action. However, if the response is HTTP code 200, it extracts the payload with base64 and decrypts it using RC4 with another hardcoded key (“W29ab@ad%Df324V$Yd“). The decrypted data is an executable file that is prepended with the “MAX_PATHjeusD” string.

During our research, we found other similar files. One was created on August 3rd and another on August 11th. The PDB path shows that the author keeps improving this updater tool, apparently forked from some stable version released on July 2, 2018 according to the internal directory name.

Additional trojanized sample #1 Additional trojanized sample #1
Installation package MD5 4126e1f34cf282c354e17587bb6e8da3 0bdb652bbe15942e866083f29fb6dd62
Package creation date 2018-08-03 09:57:29 2018-08-13 0:12:10
Dropped updater MD5 ffae703a1e327380d85880b9037a0aeb bbbcf6da5a4c352e8846bf91c3358d5c
Updater creation date 2018-08-03 09:50:08 2018-08-11 7:28:08
Updater Build path H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000009\Release\dloader.pdb H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000006\Release\dloader.pdb

Note the TManager directory in the PDB path from the table. It will pop up again in another unexpected place later.

Trojanized trading program for macOS

For macOS users, Celas LLC also provided a native version of its trading app. A hidden “autoupdater” module is installed in the background to start immediately after installation, and after each system reboot. It keeps contacting the command and control (C2) server in order to download and run an additional executable from the server. The communication conforms to the Windows version of the updater and is disguised as an image file upload and download, while carrying encrypted data inside.

We have analyzed the following installation file:

MD5: 48ded52752de9f9b73c6bf9ae81cb429
File Size: 15,020,544 bytes
File Type: DMG disk image
Known file name: celastradepro_mac_installer_1.00.00.dmg
Date of creation: 13 July 2018

Once the Cellas Trade Pro app is installed on macOS, it starts the Updater application on the system load via a file named “.com.celastradepro.plist” (note that it starts with a dot symbol, which makes it unlisted in the Finder app or default Terminal directory listing). The “Updater” file is passed the “CheckUpdate” parameter on start.

Celas Trade Pro app plist file (Apple Property List)

The command-line argument “CheckUpdate” looks redundant from a code analysis perspective: there is no other argument that the application expects. In the absence of all arguments, it doesn’t do anything and quits. This may or may not be way to trick sandboxes that could automatically execute this trojan updater, with no suspicious activity produced without such a “secret” extra argument. The choice of a benign string such as “CheckUpdate” helps it to hide in plain sight of any user or administrator looking into running processes.

The trojanized updater works similar to the Windows version in many ways. Both applications are implemented using a cross-platform QT framework. Upon launch, the downloader creates a unique identifier for the infected host using a “%09d-%06d” format string template. Next, the app collects basic system information, which for macOS is done via dedicated QT classes:

  • Host name
  • OS type and version
  • System architecture
  • OS kernel type and version

The process of encrypting and transferring data is the same as in the Windows version. This information is XOR-encrypted with hardcoded 16-byte static key “Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y”, prepended with GIF89a header and uploaded to the C2 server via HTTP POST and the following URL:

https://www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

POST request template strings

The module relies on a hardcoded User-Agent string for macOS:
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.139 Safari/537.36

Once the server replies, it checks the HTTP response code. HTTP response code 300 indicates that the server has no task for the updater and the application terminates immediately. If the HTTP response is code 200, then the updater gets the data in the response, decodes it from base64 encoding and decrypts it using RC4 with the hardcoded static key “W29ab@ad%Df324V$Yd“. It calculates the MD5 of the decoded and decrypted data, which is compared to a value stored inside, to verify the integrity of the transferred file. After that, the payload is extracted and saved to a hardcoded file location “/var/zdiffsec“, sets executable permissions for all users and starts the app with another secret hardcoded command-line argument “bf6a0c760cc642“. Apparently the command-line argument is the way to prevent the detection of its malicious functionality via sandboxes or even reverse engineering. We have previously seen this technique adopted by Lazarus group in 2016 in attacks against banks. As of 2018, it is still using this in almost every attack we investigated.

Downloaded payload

According to data from Kaspersky Security Network, the threat actor delivered the malicious payload using one of the shadowy updaters described above. We found a malicious file created at the same host:

MD5: 0a15a33844c9df11f12a4889ae7b7e4b
File Size: 104,898,560 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Recovery\msn.exe
Link time: 2018-04-19 13:30:19

Note the unusually large size for an executable file. We believe that it was inflated with junk data on purpose to prevent easy download or transfer over the internet.

Searching for the reason for the malware’s appearance on the system revealed that there was an additional process responsible for producing several files before this malware was launched, suggesting a trojan dropper in action. The main function of this malware is to implant the Fallchill backdoor loader linked to several files. Upon launch, the malware checks one of the command-line arguments passed to it. The malware chooses one of the service names located in the following registry value as a disguise:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\netsvcs

This value includes a list of several dozen standard system service names.

The randomly chosen service name is used to name the dropped file and newly registered Windows service. Let’s refer to this randomly chosen service name as [service]. The malware contains references to several files inside:

  • The file passed as argument: contains a 16-byte key
  • msncf.dat: Encrypted configuration data
  • msndll.tmp: Encrypted Fallchill loader
  • msndll.dat: Encrypted Fallchill backdoor (payload for the loader)
  • [service]svc.dll: Fallchill backdoor loader
  • [service].dat: Copy of msndll.dat

A mix of the above-mentioned files produces the final backdoor known as Fallchill. A more detailed procedure for technical specialists is as follows:

  1. Check whether the command-line argument points to a file of 16 byte size.
  2. Read the file passed via the command-line argument. The contents of this file contains a crypto key, which we will call the main key.
  3. Open the msncf.dat file (configuration file). If the file size equals 192 bytes, read the content of the file.
  4. Open msndll.tmp file and decrypt it using the main key.
  5. Create the [service]svc.dll file and fill it with pseudo-random data.
    1. The malware fills the file with 10,240 bytes of pseudo-random data, and iterates (rand() % 10 + 10240) times. This is why it produces files which are at least 104,851,000 bytes.
  6. Copy the 16-byte main key at the end of the [service]svc.dll file.
  7. Encrypt the [service].dat file name with the main key and append it at the end of [service]svc.dll.
  8. Overwrite the beginning of [service]svc.dll with data decrypted from msndll.tmp.
  9. Move msndll.dat file to [service].dat.
  10. Delete temporary files: msndll.tmp, msncf.dat, msndll.log.
  11. Timestamp [service]svc.dll and [service].dat files.
  12. Register [service]svc.dll as a Windows service.
  13. Save a copy of data from msncf.dat file in the following registry value
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description.

Infection process diagram

Fallchill backdoor loader

We confirmed that the following malware was created on the infected host using the method described above:

Fallchill backdoor loader:

MD5: e1ed584a672cab33af29114576ad6cce
File Size: 104,878,356 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgrsvc.dll
Link time: 2018-01-18 01:56:32

Encrypted Fallchill backdoor:

MD5: d8484469587756ce0d10a09027044808
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: encrypted data
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgr.dat

Upon starting, uploadmgrsvc.dll reads 276 bytes from the end of its own executable file. The first 16 bytes of this 276-byte data are used as a decryption key, and the remaining 260 bytes contain the encrypted file path used by the backdoor.

Data at the end of the loader module

After decryption of the last 260-bytes, the malware retrieves the name or path of the file that contains the actual backdoor body in encrypted form.

Decrypted file name in the end of loader module

The malware reads the specified file and decrypts it using the same decryption routine. This is how the executable code of the backdoor is produced in memory and executed by the loader. Below is the meta information about the decrypted final payload in memory:

MD5: d7089e6bc8bd137a7241a7ad297f975d
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Link Time: 2018-03-16 07:15:31

We can summarize the Fallchill backdoor loading process as follows:

Loading the Fallchill backdoor

As mentioned previously, the final payload belongs to a Fallchill malware cluster formerly attributed to the Lazarus APT group. Upon launching, this malware resolves the API function addresses at runtime, and reads the C2 server address from the registry value created during the installation stage:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description

If there is no configuration value, the malware falls back to a default C2 server address.

  • 196.38.48[.]121
  • 185.142.236[.]226

This is a full-featured backdoor that contains enough functions to fully control the infected host. Some of its network protocol commands are described below.

Command ID Description
0x8000 Write current time and configuration data to registry key
0x8001 Send configuration data
0x8002 Replace configuration data in the fixed registry value
0x8003 Execute Windows command, store output in temp file and upload contents to C2
0x8006 Show current working directory
0x8007 Change current working directory
0x8008 Collect process information
0x8009 Terminate process
0x8010 Start new process
0x8011 Create process with security context of the current user
0x8012 Connect to specified host/port
0x8013 Get drive information
0x8014 Directory listing
0x8015 Search a file
0x8019 Write data to a specified file
0x8020 Read contents of specified file and upload to C2 server
0x8021 Compress multiples files to a temp file (name start with ZD) and upload to C2
0x8023 Wipe specific file
0x8025 Copy file time from another file time (timestamping)
0x8026 Shutdown malware service and self-delete
0x8043 Send “Not Service” unicode string to C2 server (communication test?).

This set of capabilities is very common for many Lazarus backdoors, which have been seen in other attacks against banks and financial industry in the past years.

Infrastructure

While working on the incident of the cryptocurrency company’s breach, we were curious about the legal status of the Celas LLC company that developed this trojanized trading application.

Celas LLC main homepage.

The website had a valid SSL certificate issued by Comodo CA. However, note that the certificate from this webserver mentions “Domain Control Validated”, which is a weak security verification level for a webserver. It does not mean validation of the identity of the website’s owner, nor of the actual existence of the business. When certification authorities issue this kind of certificate they only check that the owner has a certain control over the domain name, which can be abused in certain ways.

Below is the WHOIS record of the “celasllc.com” domain. The domain name was registered by an individual named “John Broox” with registrant email address “johnbroox200@gmail[.]com”.

The same name of “John Broox” was used inside the installation package of the macOS version of the trading application. The Info.plist properties file describes the package as follows:

It looks at first sight like a legitimate WHOIS record, but something doesn’t really add up here. The domain celasllc.com was the only domain registered with this email address and was exclusively used for domain registration.

The registrant used the Domain4Bitcoins service to register this domain, apparently paying with cryptocurrency. According to open-source intelligence, the address of the WHOIS information is fake, unless it’s the owner of a ramen shop running a cryptocurrency exchange software development studio on the side.

View of the location referred in the WHOIS record. Image source: Google Maps.

The server hosting celasllc.com (185.142.236.213) belongs to the Blackhost ISP in the Netherlands.

WHOIS record of cellasllc.com server

Coincidentally, the Fallchill malware authors also preferred to use the same hosting company to host their C2 server. Moreover, the Celas LLC web server and one of the C2 servers of the Fallchill malware are located in the same network segment of this ISP:

  • Celas LLC infrastructure:
    • 185.142.236.213: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Fallchill malware C2 server:
    • 196.38.48[.]121: South Africa Internet Solutions AS3741
    • 185.142.236[.]226: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Additional attacker’s server from telemetry
    • 80.82.64[.]91: Seychelles Incrediserve Ltd AS29073
    • 185.142.239[.]173: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174

However, when you look into Celas Trading Pro application’s digital signature, including its “Updater”, you will find that this certificate was also issued by Comodo CA, which refers to a company address in the United States.

According to open-source data, this address doesn’t belong to a real business, and looks on maps like a meadow with a small forest and small real estate offering nearby.

Location of Cellas LLC, according to its digital certificate

Real estate history of that address

Pivoting the infrastructure a little further brings up some more suspicious things. It appears that the domain referred to two IPs, one of which was linked to a few other suspicious domains, according to PassiveDNS.

Cellas LLC linked infrastructure

The owners of the linked infrastructural elements preferred to use several interesting services for hosting domain registration. All these service providers offer a certain level of anonymity to their customers. Most of them accept Bitcoins as a main payment method to keep their customers anonymous. This is very uncommon for companies running a legitimate business.

Hosting services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Blackhost (https://black.host/)
  • Liberty VPS (https://libertyvps.net/)

Domain registration services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Domains4Bitcoins (https://www.domains4bitcoins.com/)
  • NameCheap (https://www.namecheap.com/)
  • ChangeIP (https://www.changeip.com/)
  • Njalla (https://njal.la/)

All the facts above can make the more sceptical among us doubt the intentions of Celas LLC and the legitimacy of this business. Of course, these facts alone would not be enough to accuse Celas LLC of committing a crime.

Attribution

Kaspersky Lab has previously attributed the Fallchill malware cluster to Lazarus group when it attacked the financial sector around the world. It was also confirmed by other security vendors, and the national CERT of US.

RC4 key from the older Fallchill

Fallchill malware uses a RC4 algorithm with a 16-byte key to protect its communications. The key extracted from the Fallchill variant used in the current attack is DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B.

Current RC4 key of Fallchill

We were able to confirm that some of older Fallchill malware variants used exactly the same RC4 key. Below are Fallchill malware samples that used the same key (the compilation timestamp may indicate the date of malware creation).

MD5 Timestamp
81c3a3c5a0129477b59397173fdc0b01 2017-05-26 23:37:04
6cb34af551b3fb63df6c9b86900cf044 2017-06-09 17:24:30
21694c8db6234df74102e8b5994b7627 2017-11-07 17:54:19
5ad7d35f0617595f26d565a3b7ebc6d0 2015-10-24 01:52:11
c501ea6c56ba9133c3c26a7d5ed4ce49 2017-06-09 03:59:43
cafda7b3e9a4f86d4bd005075040a712 2017-11-07 17:54:33
cea1a63656fb199dd5ab90528188e87c 2017-06-12 19:25:31
6b061267c7ddeb160368128a933d38be 2017-11-09 17:18:06
56f5088f488e50999ee6cced1f5dd6aa 2017-06-13 08:17:51
cd6796f324ecb7cf34bc9bc38ce4e649 2016-04-17 03:26:56

Same C2 server with older Fallchill

We have confirmed that the C2 server addresses (196.38.48[.]121, 185.142.236[.]226) used in this attack have been used by the older variant of Fallchill.

MD5 Timestamp
94dfcabd8ba5ca94828cd5a88d6ed488 2016-10-24 02:31:18
14b6d24873f19332701177208f85e776 2017-06-07 06:41:27
abec84286df80704b823e698199d89f7 2017-01-18 04:29:29

Overlap of C2 infrastructure

Apparently, the attackers using the Fallchill malware continue to reuse code and C2 server infrastructure over and over again.

According to Kaspersky Security Network, Fallchill was not the only malware used in this attack. There was another backdoor that was used by the threat actor. We omit a full description of this backdoor in the current report to keep the write-up to an acceptable length, but we would like to highlight two important things discovered in it. First, this backdoor was created on 2018-07-12 and revealed an already familiar directory, “TManager”, which we previously saw in the Updater.exe application from the Cellas Trading Pro suite:

H:\DEV\TManager\all_BOSS_troy\T_4.2\T_4.2\Server_\x64\Release\ServerDll.pdb

Second, what is probably one of the most interesting findings to come from this additional backdoor was discovered hidden in hardcoded headers used to communicate with C2 server. The Accept-Language HTTP header string revealed a language code associated with North Korea. In our experience, this is something we normally don’t see in malware.

Accept-Language: ko-kp,ko-kr;q=0.8,ko;q=0.6,en-us;q=0.4,en;q=0.2

Accept-Language HTTP header value in the body of the backdoor

Conclusions

The Lazarus APT group’s continuous attacks on the financial sector are not much of a surprise to anyone. A lot of research has been done and published about such attacks. However, we think this case makes a difference. Recent investigation shows how aggressive the group is and how its strategies may evolve in the future.

First of all, Lazarus group has entered a new platform: macOS. There is steadily growing interest in macOS from ordinary users, especially in IT companies. Many developers and engineers are switching to using macOS. Apparently, in the chase after advanced users, software developers from supply chains and some high profile targets, threat actors are forced to have macOS malware tools. We believe that in the future Lazarus is going to support all platforms that software developers are using as a base platform, because compromising developers opens many doors at once.

We cannot say with full certainty whether Celas LLC was compromised and the threat actor abused it to push malware through an update mechanism. However, the multiple successful Lazarus attempts to compromise supply chain companies suggest that it will keep exploring this infection method. From all angles, the Celas LLC story looks like the threat actor has found an elaborate way to create a legitimate looking business and inject a malicious payload into a “legitimate looking” software update mechanism. Sounds logical: if one cannot compromise a supply chain, why not to make fake one?

This should be a lesson to all of us and a wake-up call to businesses relying on third-party software. Do not automatically trust the code running on your systems. Neither good looking website, nor solid company profile nor the digital certificates guarantee the absence of backdoors. Trust has to be earned and proven. Stay safe!

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Galileo Protocol launches LEOX airdrop with 250,000 token reward pool 3198

In a significant move towards integrating blockchain technology with real-world assets, Galileo Protocol is thrilled to announce its LEOX token airdrop, designed to engage and expand its community. The airdrop features a generous pool of 250,000 LEOX tokens and offers participants a firsthand experience in a leading-edge RWA tokenisation ecosystem.

Exploring the Reward Pool

  • Fairdrop Pool: 150,000 LEOX dedicated to holders of Nebula and NFT communities who embody the web3 experience (CommuNFTy Pool).
  • Farmooor Pool: 100,000 LEOX allocated to active Galileo Marketplace participants.

Fairdrop Pool access

  1. Eligibility: Hold an unlisted Nebula or partner NFT (to be announced in early May) during the snapshot period (April 3rd – June 1st).
  2. Snapshot verification: Ensure NFTs are in your wallet during the June 1st snapshot.
  3. Receive LEOX Tokens: Tokens will be automatically distributed on June 15th to eligible wallets.

Farmooor Pool Access

  1. Marketplace registration: Sign up at the Galileo Marketplace and complete KYC verification.
  2. Social engagement: Share your sign up on your socials. Galileo will be adding a link input feature for participation.
  3. Active participation: Make purchases on the marketplace from April 3rd to September 30th.
  4. Final verification: Maintain active participation through the September 30th snapshot.
  5. Token distribution: Eligible participants will receive their tokens on October 31st.

Participation Benefits

This airdrop is more than a reward; it’s an invitation to explore the transformative potential of RWAs on the blockchain. Participants will gain early access to a platform that blends the physical and digital worlds, creating secure, transparent, and liquid markets for assets previously constrained by traditional boundaries.

Why Galileo Protocol?

Galileo Protocol stands at the forefront of the RWA blockchain movement, focusing on the tokenisation of tangible assets to enhance their usability, liquidity, and security in the digital age. Galileo Protocol not only supports the tokenisation of assets but also ensures their real-world applicability and integration.

Safety notice

Please interact only through official Galileo channels and verify all links before engaging. Remember, the Galileo team will never reach out via direct messaging first.

About Galileo Protocol

Dedicated to revolutionising asset management, Galileo Protocol uses blockchain technology to authenticate, tokenise, and mobilise real-world assets. This approach aims to unlock the value of physical assets and make them accessible in the crypto space, enhancing transparency and trust.

Join this forward looking journey with the Galileo Protocol’s LEOX airdrop. Step into the future of asset management and discover the full capabilities of Galileo Protocol’s RWA tokenisation platform.

Follow Galileo Protocol’s official channels

Telegram Group: @galileoprotocolcommunity
Discord Group: https://discord.gg/vQQPXXcKsv
Own a Nebula here: https://nebula.galileoprotocol.io/
Visit the Galileo Marketplace: https://app.galileoprotocol.io/

Metis’ Sequencer Mining Goes Live 5187

Last month’s launch of Phase 1 of the Metis Decentralized Sequencer upgrade established Metis as the first-ever rollup platform with a decentralized sequencer. Metis has now launched Phase 2, which introduces several enhancements aimed at improving network incentives and participation.

Among other positive changes, Phase 2 of the Decentralized Sequencer upgrade introduced the most awaited feature up to date for the Layer 2 network: Sequencer Mining.

Sequencer Mining will allow users to lock their tokens via LST providers, contributing to the network’s security. Essentially, these LST providers will interact with the Sequencer, and users will interact with the Liquid Staking providers, receiving a Liquid Staking Token that they can reuse in other DeFi dApps or just hold. Through Metis’ Community Ecosystem Governance (CEG), the community chose Artemis Finance and Enki Protocol as the two LST protocols for the Alpha Phase.

In the first year, sequencer nodes will benefit from a 20% Mining Rewards Rate (MRR), the same rate at which smart contracts compensate participants for producing blocks. Additionally, Metis Liquid Staking Blitz (LSB), supported by the Metis EDF, will provide grants to verified projects to accelerate growth. More than 220,000 METIS are committed in grants for 2024 alone to support MetisLSB and catalyze growth of LST products on Metis. Prior to the official launch of Sequencer Mining, there has been notable activity with LST-related products, including deployments by Shoebill Finance, Stablis Protocol, and participation pools on Hercules Finance.

Metis has secured important partnerships with recognized crypto institutions that will help the network achieve proper decentralization and high participation rates on the Decentralized Sequencer.

Users can deposit and start mining immediately through Artemis. ENKI will be fully launching on Mainnet soon, but users can already participate in their “Pre-Staking” program.

About Artemis

Artemis Finance is a liquid staking protocol designed exclusively for Metis’ Decentralized Sequencer. Users can stake METIS tokens on Artemis Finance and receive the liquid staking token artMETIS.

About Enki

Enki Protocol is a Metis-native liquid staking protocol leveraging dual-token architecture from protocols like Frax and Lido to implement the most battle-tested LST design to the Metis Decentralized Sequencer. Users can stake METIS via Enki and receive seMETIS, while the protocol utilizes ENKI for its governance.

About Metis

Metis is an EVM-Equivalent Ethereum Layer-2 protocol focused on bridging the gap between Web2 and Web3. Metis provides users with a decentralized and scalable easy-to-use network secured by Ethereum. Metis became the first Ethereum rollup to decentralize its sequencer with the launch of Decentralized Sequencer, which enhances network security and provides more potentially revenue-earning opportunities for users.

Peach Tech and MetaComp Launch PIF Token, a Regulatory Registered Real-World Asset Token Scheme 6651

In an innovative move that blends the stability of traditional finance with the flexibility of decentralized finance (DeFi), Peach Tech Limited (via strategic investment manager, Kepler Global Management Limited), and MetaComp Pte Ltd, a Major Payment Institution licensed holder permitted by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to provide Digital Payment Token Services, are proud to announce the launch of the Peach Investment Fund Token (PIF Token). This strategic initiative follows the growing integration of blockchain technologies in financial markets, as seen in the successful deployment of Bitcoin ETFs and the rapid expansion of DeFi platforms, allowing Real-World Asset (RWA) tokens to be transferred on the Blockchain while keeping an oversight of ownership and safety of the underlying assets.

The PIF Token Scheme, registered with the MAS’ CISNET, offers a secure and compliant channel for investing in assets like USD deposits, Money Market Funds, and Treasury Bills. The legal and regulatory frameworks governing the PIF Token ensure that it meets stringent standards for safety, compliance, and transparency, making it a true landmark development in the financial sector, boosting investor confidence and enhancing liquidity.

Mr David Koh, Co-Founder of Peach Tech, discussed the strategic impact of the collaboration, stating, “The PIF Token is designed to meet the high standards of liquidity and flexibility demanded by modern investors, blending the best of blockchain efficiency with the robust safety protocols of traditional finance.”

Dr. Bo Bai, Executive Chairman and Co-Founder of MetaComp, highlighted the innovations brought about by the PIF Token, adding, “This token is not just a step towards future-proofing our financial ecosystems, but also a significant advancement towards our belief in being the bridge that links Traditional Finance with Crypto-Finance. We believe that this collaboration will be able to offer both traditional Accredited Investors and Corporation alike with a unique opportunity to leverage digital assets in a safe and compliant manner.”

About Peach Tech Limited (http://peach.tech)

Peach Tech is leading the charge in bridging the gap between traditional financial assets and blockchain technology, developing products that enhance market efficiency, transparency, and accessibility. Headquartered in Hong Kong, Peach Tech continues to push the boundaries of what is possible in finance.

About MetaComp Pte Ltd (www.mce.sg)

MetaComp is a leading Singapore-based digital asset platform that is licensed and regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) under the Payments Services Act. Operating under a P2B2C (platform-to-business, partners-to-clients) model, MetaComp provides an integrated end-to-end suite of services to its clients, empowering them to confidently enter the digital asset market with the much-needed safety, security, and compliance. Together with its parent company Metaverse Green Exchange Pte. Ltd (a MAS licensed CMS holder permitted to carry our inter alia, brokerage and custody), MetaComp introduces its suite of services through CAMP by MetaComp, a regulated Client Assets Management Platform, allowing businesses to develop and scale their digital asset offerings through OTC and exchange trading services, fiat payment, digital asset custody and prime brokerage.

ANTO Embarks on a Journey, Initiating a New Era in Cryptocurrency Asset Management 6741

ANTO International Asset Custody Platform is delighted to announce the upcoming global launch of its Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) on April 16th, North American time. This milestone marks a significant step into the realm of digital asset investment. ANTO provides secure and robust digital asset investment services for global investors, aiming to create more opportunities for wealth growth.

As a legitimate and compliant digital asset management platform, ANTO was established in the United States, a country that has legalized cryptocurrencies. The platform has received authoritative certification from esteemed financial regulatory bodies in the United States and the United Kingdom, ensuring its legitimacy and credibility. ANTO adheres strictly to regulatory policies and laws to ensure the legality and compliance of its operations.

ANTO’s core team comprises experienced and highly skilled traders and strategy analysts with deep industry backgrounds and extensive investment experience. The team possesses core technologies to digitize Wall Street data intelligence and real-time trading, enabling ANTO to enter the field of cryptocurrency asset trading and provide investors with stable and efficient investment services.

ANTO offers investors diversified investment products and services, covering multiple areas such as digital currency funds, quantitative trading, and liquidity provision. The platform is committed to providing investors with secure, transparent, and high-yielding investment opportunities, catering to various needs and risk preferences.

Investors can enjoy the following premium services and support from ANTO:

  1. Diversified Investment Products: ANTO offers a variety of investment products and services, including liquidity investments, compound interest asset management products, and ETF investments, catering to the diverse needs and risk preferences of investors.
  2. Robust Investment Strategies: With a strong research team and technical team, ANTO is committed to developing and implementing innovative investment strategies and trading schemes, providing investors with stable and efficient investment services.
  3. Security and Compliance Assurance: ANTO strictly adheres to regulatory policies and laws to protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors and ensure the safety and compliance of platform operations.
  4. Continuous Innovation and Development: ANTO is dedicated to continuous innovation and development, constantly improving the quality and level of investment products and services, creating more value and returns for investors.

Three major product lines of ANTO, each with unique advantages and professional strengths:

1. Liquidity Investment: Stable Appreciation, Worry-Free Investment

ANTO’s liquidity investment system is an efficient capital management solution designed to provide investors with safe and reliable asset appreciation avenues. With a professional investment team and advanced risk management models, ANTO achieves stable appreciation through optimized portfolios and strict risk control measures. Investors can choose different investment periods and returns, enjoying daily investment returns of 0.12%-0.5% and easily withdrawing principal and interest at contract maturity.

2. Compound Asset Management Products: Continuous Returns, Wealth Multiplication

ANTO’s compound asset package product is a unique wealth appreciation solution that achieves continuous asset appreciation through continuous reinvestment. The platform carefully selects high-potential digital assets and invests with daily returns of 0.45%-0.7%, allowing investors’ wealth to multiply under the compound effect. Investors can choose different investment amounts and returns according to their needs, enjoying continuous returns and substantial profits upon fund exit.

3. ETF Warranted Financial Management: Diversified Allocation, Easy Investment

ANTO’s exchange-traded fund (ETF), with the right to equality of the share of income, is symbolized by AE. AE represents the equity of users based on ANTO ETF trading and holding a variety of encrypted digital assets. By pledging the AE warrants for financial management, investors can easily achieve asset allocation without complex operations, investing without worry. Holding AE, investors can enjoy returns from market appreciation and choose different financial management periods, earning daily returns of up to 1.5%.

ANTO believes that with its services and support, investors will be able to achieve their financial goals and embark on a new era of digital asset investment. Let us join hands and witness the splendid future of digital asset investment together!

zkLink Nova Unifies Liquidity On-Chain with Token Merge Event 7025

zkLink Nova (“Nova”), the first aggregated Layer 3 (L3) ZK-Rollup network with EVM-compatibility, today announced the consolidation of stablecoins and wBTC into single tokens on Nova, enhancing liquidity within the Nova ecosystem, aimed at creating the largest liquidity pool across all Layer 2 (L2) and Layer 3 networks. The announcement follows shortly after Nova’s mainnet launch and is the next milestone in zkLink’s mission to resolve the issue of liquidity fragmentation across L2 networks.

Currently, Nova has achieved asset aggregation, allowing users to deposit native assets from various L2 networks onto Nova for cross-chain asset trading. However, having the same assets from these networks shown as different tokens on Nova (i.e. USDC.arbi, USDC.Linea, etc.) can hinder users’ trading experience. As such, Nova has deployed “MergeToken” smart contracts to consolidate assets of the same value from different chains on Nova into a single token (e.g. USDC.arbi, USDC.Linea merge into USDC). The first tokens to merge are stablecoins USDC, USDT, DAI; followed by wBTC and other tokens upon projects’ requests.

The token merge process will be managed by a prestigious governance committee of 12 prominent projects and institutions including Wintermute, Particle Network, Skynet Trading, Flowtraders, Ascensive Assets, Republic Crypto, Efficient Frontier, SIG, USDV, Layer Bank, Redstone Oracles and Manta Network. This committee will review and approve or deny the proposals to merge additional tokens into Nova’s L3 infrastructure—decentralizing decision making and preventing autonomous control.

“We’re setting the precedent for a practice that we hope more projects will adopt to make the web3 trading environment friendlier. Support from the governance committee underscores token merge’s legitimate potential to unlock new DeFi use cases.” said Vince Yang, CEO and co-founder of zkLink. “Our liquidity pool from MergeToken provides the industry’s most flexible, secure resource that cuts the frustration of fragmented stablecoin transfers, especially useful as more RWAs & LRTs go on-chain.”

MergeToken allows zkLink developers to deploy dApps that take full advantage of consolidated liquidity for tokens of the same value, expanding the kinds of use cases projects can offer and fosters more growth to encourage cross-chain user interaction. Nova will serve as the network on which assets of the same value can be combined into a single token—boosting liquidity of the Nova network as well as overall L2 ecosystem.

When users deposit into MergeToken smart contracts, users will gain the equivalent value of unified tokens. On the other hand, unified tokens deposited into the same contract will be burned and the user will receive the original source tokens of the same value.

MergeToken contracts are upgradable to meet new token unification requirements given Nova’s expansion in connecting different networks. Through voting on a multi-sig safe wallet, the governance committee approves the upgrade to add or remove tokens on the MergeToken contract. To prevent the risk from malicious upgrading, the contract will follow a multi-party signature requiring 2/3 vote for passage moving forward.

About zkLink

Dedicated to unifying liquidity and scaling the Ethereum ecosystem, zkLink is pioneering Aggregated Rollup solutions to bridge the ecosystem siloes within the blockchain space. By facilitating a more interconnected, efficient, and accessible digital asset environment, zkLink is driving forward the vision of a unified and decentralized blockchain ecosystem without boundaries.

About zkLink Nova

zkLink Nova is the pioneering Aggregated Layer 3 Rollup zkEVM network that brings unprecedented liquidity and asset aggregation to Ethereum and its Layer 2 Rollups. Built with ZK Stack and zkLink Nexus, it leverages ZK Proofs to enhance scalability and security. Developers enjoy an open platform for deploying Solidity smart contracts and instantly tapping into integrated networks like Arbitrum and zkSync. Nova simplifies DeFi by presenting a unified ecosystem for users and DApps, promoting a seamless blockchain experience.

Marine Moguls by MetFi $5.9 Million ERC-404 Airdrop Making Early Waves 6899

This groundbreaking initiative, leveraging the innovative ERC-404 protocol, is not only redefining the landscape of token and NFT distribution but also setting new records for engagement and community growth.

A Tsunami of Participation and Engagement

Since its launch, the Marine Moguls airdrop has seen a surge in activity, with thousands of enthusiasts joining the campaign, eager to be part of this unique opportunity. The promise of sharing 30% of $MOGULS among all airdrop participants has fueled an unprecedented level of interest, demonstrating the crypto community’s robust appetite for innovative and rewarding projects.

MetFi’s social media channels have been at the forefront of this tidal wave of enthusiasm, witnessing an extraordinary increase in user engagement — up to 17,000% in some cases. The growth in new followers and subscribers has been equally impressive, with some channels experiencing over a 100% increase in a few short weeks. This spike in engagement is a testament to the community’s excitement and support for the Marine Moguls project.

There’s Still Time to Dive In

With the airdrop running until May 21, 2024, there’s still ample opportunity for interested participants to join the campaign and secure their free $MOGUL tokens and NFTs. This initiative not only offers an accessible entry into the world of NFTs and tokens but also exemplifies the potential of blockchain technology to create engaging and inclusive community experiences.

Distribution and Innovation: The Heart of Marine Moguls

At the core of the Marine Moguls campaign is the innovative ERC-404 protocol, a pioneering technology that merges the best features of fungible ERC-20 and non-fungible tokens ERC-721 into a single ERC-404 smart contract thereby creating a seamless experience. This protocol ensures that NFT owners enjoy instant NFT liquidity and fractional ownership of NFTs, encapsulating the best of both worlds.

As previously announced, 3,000 Marine Mogul tokens and NFTs, representing 30% of the total supply, are being distributed through this airdrop. Participants generate points on the Marine Moguls Airdrop page, which will convert into $MOGUL tokens and NFTs at the Token Generation Event (TGE) scheduled for May 25, 2024. The campaign highlights the distribution of 2,500 NFTs with hidden prizes valued at ~$2.9 Million USDT and the allocation of 3,900 $MOGUL tokens to users who engage in staking, with the potential for high APY based on participation.

ERC-404: The Future of Token and NFT Interaction

The ERC-404 protocol’s dual nature facilitates a dynamic and fluid user experience, allowing for immediate liquidity of NFTs and fractional ownership of the Marine Moguls NFT collection. This innovative approach addresses common challenges in NFT trading, offering a more efficient and user-friendly model.

Looking Forward

As the Marine Moguls by MetFi campaign continues to make waves, it remains a beacon of innovation and community in the digital asset space. The enthusiasm and engagement from the community underscore the potential of inclusive, technologically advanced projects to shape the future of finance and digital collectibles.

To be part of this exciting journey, participants are encouraged to explore the Marine Moguls Airdrop campaign and join before the closing date on May 21, 2024. For more information, visit the Marine Moguls website and follow their social media channels for the latest updates.

About Marine Moguls by MetFi

Marine Moguls by MetFi represents a pioneering venture in the digital asset space, owned and powered by the visionary MetFi DAO. This innovative project is setting a new standard for the integration of technology and community in the blockchain arena. At its heart, Marine Moguls is not just a campaign but a revolution in how tokens and NFTs can coexist and complement each other through the cutting-edge ERC-404 protocol.

Designed to bridge the gap between the fungibility of tokens and the uniqueness of NFTs, Marine Moguls offers participants a unique opportunity to engage with the blockchain in a way that is both rewarding and revolutionary. The project’s commitment to instant NFT liquidity and fractional NFT ownership reflects a forward-thinking approach to digital assets, making it accessible and appealing to a broad audience.

By participating in the Marine Moguls by MetFi airdrop campaign, community members are not only part of an airdrop; they are at the forefront of an evolving ecosystem that challenges conventional notions of value and ownership in the digital age. Marine Moguls is a testament to MetFi’s innovative spirit and dedication to creating a more inclusive, dynamic, and valuable digital future for all.

Social Media Links

Website: https://marinemoguls.com
Telegram Chat: https://t.me/MetFiChat
Telegram News: https://t.me/MetfiNews
Discord: https://discord.gg/MetFiDAO
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@MetFiDAO
TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@Metfidao.Official
Certik: https://skynet.certik.com/projects/metfi
Medium: https://medium.com/@MetFi_DAO
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/MetfiOfficial
GitHub: https://github.com/metfi
CoinMarketCap: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/metfi2
CoinGecko: https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/metfi
Instagram: https://instagram.com/metfidao