Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware 9443

Kaspersky Lab has been assisting with incident response efforts. While investigating a cryptocurrency exchange attacked by Lazarus, we made an unexpected discovery. The victim had been infected with the help of a trojanized cryptocurrency trading application, which had been recommended to the company over email. It turned out that an unsuspecting employee of the company had willingly downloaded a third-party application from a legitimate looking website and their computer had been infected with malware known as Fallchill, an old tool that Lazarus has recently switched back to. There have been multiple reports on the reappearance of Fallchill, including one from US-CERT.

To ensure that the OS platform was not an obstacle to infecting targets, it seems the attackers went the extra mile and developed malware for other platforms, including for macOS. A version for Linux is apparently coming soon, according to the website. It’s probably the first time we see this APT group using malware for macOS.

The fact that the Lazarus group has expanded its list of targeted operating systems should be a wake-up call for users of non-Windows platforms.

Trojanized cryptocurrency trading application

Thanks to Kaspersky Lab’s malicious-behavior detection technology, implemented in its endpoint security software, we were able to reassemble the stages of infection and trace them back to their origin. This helped us understand that one of Lazarus’ victims was infected with malware after installing a cryptocurrency trading program. We also confirmed that the user installed this program via a download link delivered over email.

Trojanized trading application for Windows

Including malicious code into distributed software and putting that on a website would be too obvious. Instead, the attackers went for a more elaborate scheme: the trojan code was pushed out in the form of an update for a trading application.

A legitimate-looking application called Celas Trade Pro from Celas Limited showed no signs of malicious behaviour and looked genuine. This application is an all-in-one style cryptocurrency trading program developed by Celas.

Screenshot of Celas Trade Pro

When we started this research, any user could download the trading application from the Celas website. Checking the installation package downloaded from the website confirmed the presence of a very suspicious updater.

Installation package download page

We have analyzed the following Windows version of the installation package:

MD5: 9e740241ca2acdc79f30ad2c3f50990a
File name: celastradepro_win_installer_1.00.00.msi
File type: MSI installer
Creation time: 2018-06-29 01:16:00 UTC

At the end of the installation process, the installer immediately runs the Updater.exe module with the “CheckUpdate” parameter. This file looks like a regular tool and most likely will not arouse the suspicion of system administrators. After all, it even contains a valid digital signature, which belongs to the same vendor. But the devil is in the detail, as usual.

The code writer developed this project under the codename “jeus”, which was discovered in a PDB path included in the updater and used as unique HTTP multipart message data separator string. Because of this, and the fact that the attacked platforms include Apple macOS, we decided to call this Operation AppleJeus.

Properties of the shady updater tool included in the package are:

MD5: b054a7382adf6b774b15f52d971f3799
File Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Known file name: %Program Files%\CelasTradePro\Updater.exe
Link Time: 2018-06-15 10:56:27 UTC
Build path: Z:\jeus\downloader\downloader_exe_vs2010\Release\dloader.pdb

The main purpose of Updater.exe is to collect the victim’s host information and send it back to the server. Upon launch, the malware creates a unique string with the format string template “%09d-%05d” based on random values, which is used as a unique identifier of the infected host. This malware collects process lists, excluding “[System Process]” and “System” processes and gets the exact OS version from the registry value at “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion”. It seems that such values only exist from Windows 10, so we assume that the author developed and tested it on Windows 10.

  • ProductName: Windows OS version
  • CurrentBuildNumber: Windows 10 build version
  • ReleaseID: Windows 10 version information
  • UBR: Sub version of Windows 10 build
  • BuildBranch: Windows 10 build branch information

The code encrypts the collected information with the hardcoded XOR key (“Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y“) before uploading it to the server.

Data encryption routine

The code sends the victim’s information to a webserver using HTTP and the following URL:
www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

The server is a legitimate looking website owned by the developer of the program: Celas LLC. At this point we were not able to conclude with high confidence whether the server was compromised by the threat actor or had belonged to the threat actor from the beginning. To learn more about the server, please read the “Infrastructure” section below.

The malware used a hardcoded User-Agent string “Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)” and fixed a multipart form data separator string “jeus“.

Using encryption, the custom separator string wouldn’t be a red flag for a legitimate application, but sending a request with the context-irrelevant string “get_config”, as well as uploading collected system information as “temp.gif”, mimicking a GIF image with a magic number in the header, definitely made us raise our eyebrows.

Communication with the C2 server

After successfully uploading data, the updater checks the server response. If the server responds with HTTP code 300, it means the updater should keep quiet and take no action. However, if the response is HTTP code 200, it extracts the payload with base64 and decrypts it using RC4 with another hardcoded key (“[email protected]%Df324V$Yd“). The decrypted data is an executable file that is prepended with the “MAX_PATHjeusD” string.

During our research, we found other similar files. One was created on August 3rd and another on August 11th. The PDB path shows that the author keeps improving this updater tool, apparently forked from some stable version released on July 2, 2018 according to the internal directory name.

Additional trojanized sample #1 Additional trojanized sample #1
Installation package MD5 4126e1f34cf282c354e17587bb6e8da3 0bdb652bbe15942e866083f29fb6dd62
Package creation date 2018-08-03 09:57:29 2018-08-13 0:12:10
Dropped updater MD5 ffae703a1e327380d85880b9037a0aeb bbbcf6da5a4c352e8846bf91c3358d5c
Updater creation date 2018-08-03 09:50:08 2018-08-11 7:28:08
Updater Build path H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000009\Release\dloader.pdb H:\DEV\TManager\DLoader\20180702\dloader\WorkingDir\Output\00000006\Release\dloader.pdb

Note the TManager directory in the PDB path from the table. It will pop up again in another unexpected place later.

Trojanized trading program for macOS

For macOS users, Celas LLC also provided a native version of its trading app. A hidden “autoupdater” module is installed in the background to start immediately after installation, and after each system reboot. It keeps contacting the command and control (C2) server in order to download and run an additional executable from the server. The communication conforms to the Windows version of the updater and is disguised as an image file upload and download, while carrying encrypted data inside.

We have analyzed the following installation file:

MD5: 48ded52752de9f9b73c6bf9ae81cb429
File Size: 15,020,544 bytes
File Type: DMG disk image
Known file name: celastradepro_mac_installer_1.00.00.dmg
Date of creation: 13 July 2018

Once the Cellas Trade Pro app is installed on macOS, it starts the Updater application on the system load via a file named “.com.celastradepro.plist” (note that it starts with a dot symbol, which makes it unlisted in the Finder app or default Terminal directory listing). The “Updater” file is passed the “CheckUpdate” parameter on start.

Celas Trade Pro app plist file (Apple Property List)

The command-line argument “CheckUpdate” looks redundant from a code analysis perspective: there is no other argument that the application expects. In the absence of all arguments, it doesn’t do anything and quits. This may or may not be way to trick sandboxes that could automatically execute this trojan updater, with no suspicious activity produced without such a “secret” extra argument. The choice of a benign string such as “CheckUpdate” helps it to hide in plain sight of any user or administrator looking into running processes.

The trojanized updater works similar to the Windows version in many ways. Both applications are implemented using a cross-platform QT framework. Upon launch, the downloader creates a unique identifier for the infected host using a “%09d-%06d” format string template. Next, the app collects basic system information, which for macOS is done via dedicated QT classes:

  • Host name
  • OS type and version
  • System architecture
  • OS kernel type and version

The process of encrypting and transferring data is the same as in the Windows version. This information is XOR-encrypted with hardcoded 16-byte static key “Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y”, prepended with GIF89a header and uploaded to the C2 server via HTTP POST and the following URL:

https://www.celasllc[.]com/checkupdate.php

POST request template strings

The module relies on a hardcoded User-Agent string for macOS:
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.139 Safari/537.36

Once the server replies, it checks the HTTP response code. HTTP response code 300 indicates that the server has no task for the updater and the application terminates immediately. If the HTTP response is code 200, then the updater gets the data in the response, decodes it from base64 encoding and decrypts it using RC4 with the hardcoded static key “[email protected]%Df324V$Yd“. It calculates the MD5 of the decoded and decrypted data, which is compared to a value stored inside, to verify the integrity of the transferred file. After that, the payload is extracted and saved to a hardcoded file location “/var/zdiffsec“, sets executable permissions for all users and starts the app with another secret hardcoded command-line argument “bf6a0c760cc642“. Apparently the command-line argument is the way to prevent the detection of its malicious functionality via sandboxes or even reverse engineering. We have previously seen this technique adopted by Lazarus group in 2016 in attacks against banks. As of 2018, it is still using this in almost every attack we investigated.

Downloaded payload

According to data from Kaspersky Security Network, the threat actor delivered the malicious payload using one of the shadowy updaters described above. We found a malicious file created at the same host:

MD5: 0a15a33844c9df11f12a4889ae7b7e4b
File Size: 104,898,560 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Recovery\msn.exe
Link time: 2018-04-19 13:30:19

Note the unusually large size for an executable file. We believe that it was inflated with junk data on purpose to prevent easy download or transfer over the internet.

Searching for the reason for the malware’s appearance on the system revealed that there was an additional process responsible for producing several files before this malware was launched, suggesting a trojan dropper in action. The main function of this malware is to implant the Fallchill backdoor loader linked to several files. Upon launch, the malware checks one of the command-line arguments passed to it. The malware chooses one of the service names located in the following registry value as a disguise:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\netsvcs

This value includes a list of several dozen standard system service names.

The randomly chosen service name is used to name the dropped file and newly registered Windows service. Let’s refer to this randomly chosen service name as [service]. The malware contains references to several files inside:

  • The file passed as argument: contains a 16-byte key
  • msncf.dat: Encrypted configuration data
  • msndll.tmp: Encrypted Fallchill loader
  • msndll.dat: Encrypted Fallchill backdoor (payload for the loader)
  • [service]svc.dll: Fallchill backdoor loader
  • [service].dat: Copy of msndll.dat

A mix of the above-mentioned files produces the final backdoor known as Fallchill. A more detailed procedure for technical specialists is as follows:

  1. Check whether the command-line argument points to a file of 16 byte size.
  2. Read the file passed via the command-line argument. The contents of this file contains a crypto key, which we will call the main key.
  3. Open the msncf.dat file (configuration file). If the file size equals 192 bytes, read the content of the file.
  4. Open msndll.tmp file and decrypt it using the main key.
  5. Create the [service]svc.dll file and fill it with pseudo-random data.
    1. The malware fills the file with 10,240 bytes of pseudo-random data, and iterates (rand() % 10 + 10240) times. This is why it produces files which are at least 104,851,000 bytes.
  6. Copy the 16-byte main key at the end of the [service]svc.dll file.
  7. Encrypt the [service].dat file name with the main key and append it at the end of [service]svc.dll.
  8. Overwrite the beginning of [service]svc.dll with data decrypted from msndll.tmp.
  9. Move msndll.dat file to [service].dat.
  10. Delete temporary files: msndll.tmp, msncf.dat, msndll.log.
  11. Timestamp [service]svc.dll and [service].dat files.
  12. Register [service]svc.dll as a Windows service.
  13. Save a copy of data from msncf.dat file in the following registry value
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description.

Infection process diagram

Fallchill backdoor loader

We confirmed that the following malware was created on the infected host using the method described above:

Fallchill backdoor loader:

MD5: e1ed584a672cab33af29114576ad6cce
File Size: 104,878,356 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgrsvc.dll
Link time: 2018-01-18 01:56:32

Encrypted Fallchill backdoor:

MD5: d8484469587756ce0d10a09027044808
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: encrypted data
Known file name: C:\Windows\system32\uploadmgr.dat

Upon starting, uploadmgrsvc.dll reads 276 bytes from the end of its own executable file. The first 16 bytes of this 276-byte data are used as a decryption key, and the remaining 260 bytes contain the encrypted file path used by the backdoor.

Data at the end of the loader module

After decryption of the last 260-bytes, the malware retrieves the name or path of the file that contains the actual backdoor body in encrypted form.

Decrypted file name in the end of loader module

The malware reads the specified file and decrypts it using the same decryption routine. This is how the executable code of the backdoor is produced in memory and executed by the loader. Below is the meta information about the decrypted final payload in memory:

MD5: d7089e6bc8bd137a7241a7ad297f975d
File Size: 143,872 bytes
File Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Link Time: 2018-03-16 07:15:31

We can summarize the Fallchill backdoor loading process as follows:

Loading the Fallchill backdoor

As mentioned previously, the final payload belongs to a Fallchill malware cluster formerly attributed to the Lazarus APT group. Upon launching, this malware resolves the API function addresses at runtime, and reads the C2 server address from the registry value created during the installation stage:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\TaskConfigs\Description

If there is no configuration value, the malware falls back to a default C2 server address.

  • 196.38.48[.]121
  • 185.142.236[.]226

This is a full-featured backdoor that contains enough functions to fully control the infected host. Some of its network protocol commands are described below.

Command ID Description
0x8000 Write current time and configuration data to registry key
0x8001 Send configuration data
0x8002 Replace configuration data in the fixed registry value
0x8003 Execute Windows command, store output in temp file and upload contents to C2
0x8006 Show current working directory
0x8007 Change current working directory
0x8008 Collect process information
0x8009 Terminate process
0x8010 Start new process
0x8011 Create process with security context of the current user
0x8012 Connect to specified host/port
0x8013 Get drive information
0x8014 Directory listing
0x8015 Search a file
0x8019 Write data to a specified file
0x8020 Read contents of specified file and upload to C2 server
0x8021 Compress multiples files to a temp file (name start with ZD) and upload to C2
0x8023 Wipe specific file
0x8025 Copy file time from another file time (timestamping)
0x8026 Shutdown malware service and self-delete
0x8043 Send “Not Service” unicode string to C2 server (communication test?).

This set of capabilities is very common for many Lazarus backdoors, which have been seen in other attacks against banks and financial industry in the past years.

Infrastructure

While working on the incident of the cryptocurrency company’s breach, we were curious about the legal status of the Celas LLC company that developed this trojanized trading application.

Celas LLC main homepage.

The website had a valid SSL certificate issued by Comodo CA. However, note that the certificate from this webserver mentions “Domain Control Validated”, which is a weak security verification level for a webserver. It does not mean validation of the identity of the website’s owner, nor of the actual existence of the business. When certification authorities issue this kind of certificate they only check that the owner has a certain control over the domain name, which can be abused in certain ways.

Below is the WHOIS record of the “celasllc.com” domain. The domain name was registered by an individual named “John Broox” with registrant email address “[email protected][.]com”.

The same name of “John Broox” was used inside the installation package of the macOS version of the trading application. The Info.plist properties file describes the package as follows:

It looks at first sight like a legitimate WHOIS record, but something doesn’t really add up here. The domain celasllc.com was the only domain registered with this email address and was exclusively used for domain registration.

The registrant used the Domain4Bitcoins service to register this domain, apparently paying with cryptocurrency. According to open-source intelligence, the address of the WHOIS information is fake, unless it’s the owner of a ramen shop running a cryptocurrency exchange software development studio on the side.

View of the location referred in the WHOIS record. Image source: Google Maps.

The server hosting celasllc.com (185.142.236.213) belongs to the Blackhost ISP in the Netherlands.

WHOIS record of cellasllc.com server

Coincidentally, the Fallchill malware authors also preferred to use the same hosting company to host their C2 server. Moreover, the Celas LLC web server and one of the C2 servers of the Fallchill malware are located in the same network segment of this ISP:

  • Celas LLC infrastructure:
    • 185.142.236.213: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Fallchill malware C2 server:
    • 196.38.48[.]121: South Africa Internet Solutions AS3741
    • 185.142.236[.]226: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174
  • Additional attacker’s server from telemetry
    • 80.82.64[.]91: Seychelles Incrediserve Ltd AS29073
    • 185.142.239[.]173: Netherlands Blackhost Ltd. AS174 COGENT-174

However, when you look into Celas Trading Pro application’s digital signature, including its “Updater”, you will find that this certificate was also issued by Comodo CA, which refers to a company address in the United States.

According to open-source data, this address doesn’t belong to a real business, and looks on maps like a meadow with a small forest and small real estate offering nearby.

Location of Cellas LLC, according to its digital certificate

Real estate history of that address

Pivoting the infrastructure a little further brings up some more suspicious things. It appears that the domain referred to two IPs, one of which was linked to a few other suspicious domains, according to PassiveDNS.

Cellas LLC linked infrastructure

The owners of the linked infrastructural elements preferred to use several interesting services for hosting domain registration. All these service providers offer a certain level of anonymity to their customers. Most of them accept Bitcoins as a main payment method to keep their customers anonymous. This is very uncommon for companies running a legitimate business.

Hosting services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Blackhost (https://black.host/)
  • Liberty VPS (https://libertyvps.net/)

Domain registration services linked to Celas LLC:

  • Domains4Bitcoins (https://www.domains4bitcoins.com/)
  • NameCheap (https://www.namecheap.com/)
  • ChangeIP (https://www.changeip.com/)
  • Njalla (https://njal.la/)

All the facts above can make the more sceptical among us doubt the intentions of Celas LLC and the legitimacy of this business. Of course, these facts alone would not be enough to accuse Celas LLC of committing a crime.

Attribution

Kaspersky Lab has previously attributed the Fallchill malware cluster to Lazarus group when it attacked the financial sector around the world. It was also confirmed by other security vendors, and the national CERT of US.

RC4 key from the older Fallchill

Fallchill malware uses a RC4 algorithm with a 16-byte key to protect its communications. The key extracted from the Fallchill variant used in the current attack is DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B.

Current RC4 key of Fallchill

We were able to confirm that some of older Fallchill malware variants used exactly the same RC4 key. Below are Fallchill malware samples that used the same key (the compilation timestamp may indicate the date of malware creation).

MD5 Timestamp
81c3a3c5a0129477b59397173fdc0b01 2017-05-26 23:37:04
6cb34af551b3fb63df6c9b86900cf044 2017-06-09 17:24:30
21694c8db6234df74102e8b5994b7627 2017-11-07 17:54:19
5ad7d35f0617595f26d565a3b7ebc6d0 2015-10-24 01:52:11
c501ea6c56ba9133c3c26a7d5ed4ce49 2017-06-09 03:59:43
cafda7b3e9a4f86d4bd005075040a712 2017-11-07 17:54:33
cea1a63656fb199dd5ab90528188e87c 2017-06-12 19:25:31
6b061267c7ddeb160368128a933d38be 2017-11-09 17:18:06
56f5088f488e50999ee6cced1f5dd6aa 2017-06-13 08:17:51
cd6796f324ecb7cf34bc9bc38ce4e649 2016-04-17 03:26:56

Same C2 server with older Fallchill

We have confirmed that the C2 server addresses (196.38.48[.]121, 185.142.236[.]226) used in this attack have been used by the older variant of Fallchill.

MD5 Timestamp
94dfcabd8ba5ca94828cd5a88d6ed488 2016-10-24 02:31:18
14b6d24873f19332701177208f85e776 2017-06-07 06:41:27
abec84286df80704b823e698199d89f7 2017-01-18 04:29:29

Overlap of C2 infrastructure

Apparently, the attackers using the Fallchill malware continue to reuse code and C2 server infrastructure over and over again.

According to Kaspersky Security Network, Fallchill was not the only malware used in this attack. There was another backdoor that was used by the threat actor. We omit a full description of this backdoor in the current report to keep the write-up to an acceptable length, but we would like to highlight two important things discovered in it. First, this backdoor was created on 2018-07-12 and revealed an already familiar directory, “TManager”, which we previously saw in the Updater.exe application from the Cellas Trading Pro suite:

H:\DEV\TManager\all_BOSS_troy\T_4.2\T_4.2\Server_\x64\Release\ServerDll.pdb

Second, what is probably one of the most interesting findings to come from this additional backdoor was discovered hidden in hardcoded headers used to communicate with C2 server. The Accept-Language HTTP header string revealed a language code associated with North Korea. In our experience, this is something we normally don’t see in malware.

Accept-Language: ko-kp,ko-kr;q=0.8,ko;q=0.6,en-us;q=0.4,en;q=0.2

Accept-Language HTTP header value in the body of the backdoor

Conclusions

The Lazarus APT group’s continuous attacks on the financial sector are not much of a surprise to anyone. A lot of research has been done and published about such attacks. However, we think this case makes a difference. Recent investigation shows how aggressive the group is and how its strategies may evolve in the future.

First of all, Lazarus group has entered a new platform: macOS. There is steadily growing interest in macOS from ordinary users, especially in IT companies. Many developers and engineers are switching to using macOS. Apparently, in the chase after advanced users, software developers from supply chains and some high profile targets, threat actors are forced to have macOS malware tools. We believe that in the future Lazarus is going to support all platforms that software developers are using as a base platform, because compromising developers opens many doors at once.

We cannot say with full certainty whether Celas LLC was compromised and the threat actor abused it to push malware through an update mechanism. However, the multiple successful Lazarus attempts to compromise supply chain companies suggest that it will keep exploring this infection method. From all angles, the Celas LLC story looks like the threat actor has found an elaborate way to create a legitimate looking business and inject a malicious payload into a “legitimate looking” software update mechanism. Sounds logical: if one cannot compromise a supply chain, why not to make fake one?

This should be a lesson to all of us and a wake-up call to businesses relying on third-party software. Do not automatically trust the code running on your systems. Neither good looking website, nor solid company profile nor the digital certificates guarantee the absence of backdoors. Trust has to be earned and proven. Stay safe!

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Massa Ecosystem’s Recent Hypergrowth Analyzed 2089

Massa’s testnet has become a magnet for more than 16 projects since its launch back in July 2021. Interest towards this innovative blockchain ecosystem has exploded since the beginning of this year. But what is it that makes Massa special?

Massa is an innovative blockchain network that aims to combine high performance with true decentralization from the ground up. The Massa testnet allows anyone to experiment with the protocol and witness its continuous improvements first-hand.

One of the main reasons why Massa attracted so many web3 pioneers in Q1 of this year is that it solves the common challenges that most Layer 1 blockchains face, such as high fees, low throughput, and centralization risks. Furthermore, Massa enables both developers and users to participate in the network governance and support the vision of a fully decentralized future.

The web3 community has clearly recognized the ultimate potential in Massa. The positive feedback from crypto developers reflects the values of the Massa core team, which is fully committed to creating a truly decentralized future. Blockchain developers are very selective and they prefer to build on blockchains that have set a clear goal to remain independent and free from any central authority. This might also explain why Massa has attracted so many projects on its testnet with only a modest seed round of 5 million USD. Unlike most Layer 1 blockchains that depend on millions of USD in ecosystem funds to lure projects, Massa’s organic ecosystem growth is remarkable.

What makes Massa’s vision so attractive to web3 developers?

Massa is a project with a dual vision for Web3’s future. It aims to provide a scalable and reliable infrastructure that allows dApps to operate in a fully decentralized and censorship-resistant manner. It also wants to ensure that smart contracts can survive on the blockchain even if the project that created them goes out of business. To make this possible, Massa hosts smart contracts on-chain and makes them serverless forever.

Additionally, Massa makes it easier for web2 developers to join the web3 movement. It uses AssemblyScript as its smart contract language, which lets any web developer write and deploy smart contracts with no extra hassle. Massa also has some unique features that distinguish it from other blockchains, such as autonomous smart contracts and web3-on-chain. These features make the network more attractive and powerful for both developers and users. The team hopes that Massa will be the platform where some of the most innovative and impactful dApps will emerge in 2023.

The perks of building projects on a supportive network

It’s important to also note that Massa is attracting more and more attention by offering customized support for every project and developer who wishes to join and contribute to its ecosystem. Projects can contact the Massa community tech support, which consists of easy-going and helpful people who are ready to assist newcomers to learn the basics of the technology. The official Discord server welcomes any questions.

The Massa team has set up two main support types geared towards projects that wish to build on the Massa chain:

Grants

Funding for projects is open to anyone in and around the community. All that is required is a creative idea. The team has the ability and desire to offer some financial assistance to the most innovative projects.

Incubation

Providing guidance for projects that require grass-roots assistance, such as initial funding or developer resources. The Massa team will evaluate the projects with strong long-term potential and determine if they meet the criteria for joining the Massa mentoring program.

Massa also offers a range of other services to projects in development, such as:

  • Advice on legal issues
  • Help with the incorporation process
  • Access to useful development resources
  • Additional funding opportunities
  • Marketing services
  • Support with creating a pitch deck, business model and tokenomics

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is worth remembering that the team behind Massa has solved the blockchain trilemma, thus creating a network that is secure, scalable and decentralized all at the same time. This is a real innovation in the blockchain space and it’s no wonder that the developers around the world are beginning to notice and want to join the Massa ecosystem.

Spark Protocol Announces Integration of Chainlink Price Feeds in First for MakerDAO Ecosystem 2066

Spark Protocol, a protocol powered by MakerDAO, the long-standing DeFi lending protocol behind the DAI decentralized stablecoin, announced today that it has successfully integrated the DAI/USD, ETH/USD, and stETH/USD Chainlink Price Feeds. In doing so, Spark Protocol is bolstering its oracle infrastructure with the industry-leading decentralized oracle network and pioneering the first integration of Chainlink Price Feeds in the MakerDAO ecosystem.

Sam MacPherson, CEO of Phoenix Labs said: “The integration of Chainlink Price Feeds was essential to bringing Spark Protocol online in a timely manner. We feel there is mutual benefit in continuing to build a relationship with Chainlink. Spark is all about openness and collaboration.”

Phoenix Labs is one of the contributors to Spark Protocol. Spark offers the lowest interest rates in DeFi through the D3M (DAI Direct Deposit module). Chainlink Price Feeds are integrated into the protocol’s lending protocol—Spark Lend—to help underpin its lending and borrowing services, which require high-quality price data to reliably price collateral value.

Johann Eid, VP of Go-To-Market at Chainlink Labs, said: “The ongoing collaboration between Chainlink and the Maker ecosystem is a huge win for DeFi. Both Chainlink and Maker are pioneers in this space, and the work being done across both ecosystems will help to ensure the continued success of not only DeFi, but the broader industry as well.”

This integration of Chainlink Price Feeds follows Maker’s integration of Chainlink Automation as part of its Keeper Network in February 2023.

About MakerDAO

MakerDAO is the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) that powers the longest-standing DeFi lending protocol and enables the creation of DAI, the original decentralized stablecoin.

Governance of MakerDAO is completely decentralized, with proposals tabled and voted on by the Maker Community, comprising people from all over the world. Utilizing an embedded governance mechanism, the decentralized and self-sustaining Maker Community holds sole authority to enact changes to the Maker Protocol through on-chain voting, using the native governance token, MKR.

For more information about MakerDAO, visit makerdao.com.

About Spark Protocol

Spark Protocol is the underlying infrastructure for Spark Lend, a decentralized lending marketplace for supplying and borrowing crypto assets with a special focus on DAI. The Spark Protocol launch is part of the Endgame Era, a long-term restructuring improvement proposal for the DAO.

For more information about Spark, visit sparkprotocol.io

About Chainlink

Chainlink is the industry-standard Web3 services platform that has enabled trillions of dollars in transaction volume across DeFi, insurance, gaming, NFTs, and other major industries. As the leading decentralized oracle network, Chainlink enables developers to build feature-rich Web3 applications with seamless access to real-world data and off-chain computation across any blockchain and provides global enterprises with a universal gateway to all blockchains.

Learn more about Chainlink by visiting chain.link or reading the developer documentation at docs.chain.link.

Adam J Ford: Setting the Golden Standard for Brokers at Wise Holdings 2124

Adam W bitcoin on stock market display screen 2022 12 15 22 32 09 utc

Adam J Ford is making waves in the financial world as a trusted advisor and mentor to many aspiring traders and investors. With over 12 years of experience in the industry, Ford has become a household name in the crypto market and has set a golden standard for brokers at Wise Holdings.

Born and raised in London, UK, Ford’s passion for finance and economics led him to attend New York University, where he earned a degree in finance. He then started his career on Wall Street as a junior analyst at a prominent investment bank and quickly worked his way up the ranks.

With his early years on Wall Street, Ford gained a deep understanding of the financial markets and honed his skills in risk management and portfolio diversification. He quickly became known for his ability to identify undervalued assets and make profitable trades, earning him a reputation as one of the top traders in the industry.

As digital currencies began to gain popularity, Ford saw an opportunity to expand his expertise and help others achieve financial success in the crypto market. He became a crypto trader and started his own advisory firm, offering personalized investment strategies and support to clients looking to make money in the crypto market.

One of Ford’s greatest strengths is his genuine care for his clients and his commitment to helping them achieve their financial goals. As a broker at Wise Holdings, he takes the time to understand each client’s individual needs and risk tolerance, crafting a tailored investment strategy that aligns with their goals. He provides ongoing support and guidance, regularly reviewing portfolios and making adjustments as needed to ensure clients are on track to reach their financial goals.

Dan, one of Ford’s clients, shared his experience working with him, saying, “Adam has been a game-changer for me. His expert advice and guidance have helped me achieve financial success beyond my wildest dreams. I feel that he genuinely cares about me and is committed to helping me achieve my goals. I couldn’t be more grateful for his expertise and support.”

Today, Ford works at Wise Holdings, a thriving advisory firm, and has a reputation as one of the most trusted and successful crypto traders in the industry. He continues to help clients make life-changing money in the crypto market and is passionate about helping others achieve financial freedom.

In Adam’s own words, “I love what I do, and I’m grateful for the opportunity to help my clients… It’s not just about making money; it’s what you choose to do with it that counts. “

In a world where the financial markets can be confusing and overwhelming, Ford provides a beacon of hope for those looking to make smart investments and achieve financial success. With his expertise, guidance, and unwavering commitment to his clients, he is helping to shape the future of the crypto market and create a better financial future for all.

Symmetry Launches Revolutionary Platform for Decentralized Crypto Indices and Actively Managed Funds on Solana 2249

Today marks a groundbreaking step for decentralized finance (DeFi) on the Solana blockchain as Symmetry launches its highly anticipated User Interface at https://app.symmetry.fi/.

The platform aims to revolutionize the way users manage their portfolios through crypto indices and actively managed funds by providing an all-in-one solution for creating, managing, buying, and selling funds.

Symmetry is a decentralized Crypto Indices and Actively Managed Funds infrastructure layer built on Solana, powered by the Symmetry Engine. This innovative on-chain asset management infrastructure covers everything from on-chain funds, indices, and multi-token liquidity pools, to liquidity routing between indices and decentralized exchange (DEX) aggregators, and public APIs for other DeFi projects to integrate Symmetry products seamlessly.

The platform offers a wide range of opportunities for both fund managers and users. Managers can create and manage funds with multiple tokens that reweigh, rebalance, and refilter according to custom rules defined by the manager, or create a trustless Crypto Index with predefined rules. Users can create their own actively managed funds or indices and buy and sell funds created by other users or protocols.

Symmetry’s liquidity provision feature allows indices and actively managed funds to act as liquidity providers on DeFi aggregators such as PRISM and Jupiter when their token weights deviate from the target weights. This groundbreaking feature not only enables funds to rebalance at zero cost but also generates fees from aggregator users for fund managers and holders, a significant departure from traditional approaches where indices and funds typically pay fees on exchanges to rebalance.

The Symmetry Engine relies on Pyth, a reliable price oracle, to determine true prices for each asset utilized in Symmetry products. This is crucial for funds to accurately determine fund values, rebalancing triggers, and buy/sell values for users.

Example use-cases for Symmetry include decentralized index fund apps, decentralized fund management apps, treasury management tools, retail onboarding apps, copy-trading apps, and investing apps. The platform envisions a future where anyone can create an index fund, manage on-chain funds and portfolio strategies, convert wallet portfolios to funds, and integrate index or actively managed fund tokens for trading.

With the launch of the Symmetry User Interface, the world of decentralized finance on the Solana blockchain is poised to experience a paradigm shift in how users interact with and manage their crypto portfolios. As the platform continues to roll out its full suite of features to all users, the future of Solana DeFi looks brighter than ever.

New DeFi Protocol, FORGE․SX, Offers Stocks and Other Synthetic Assets on Blockchain Ecosystem 2517

Individuals seeking to trade real world assets on the blockchain will have a new ally with the launch of the Forge.SX DeFi protocol.

With the convenience of a blockchain-based platform, Forge.SX empowers anyone to mint and trade synthetic versions of real-world assets with the convenience of blockchain technology. There are a number of assets available in the protocol, including commodities, stocks, and even foreign currencies. Popular stocks such as fTSLA are already available on the platform. Several plans are already in motion for the addition of additional stocks in the future.

According to the core team, the reason for offering mint trade of stocks and other synthetic assets is as follows: “As seasoned crypto investors, we understand the value and potential of synthetic assets on the blockchain and want everyone to have access to global financial markets and mint synthetic digital assets regardless of their financial status. Synthetic investments like stocks are among the most valuable. Although risks are involved in stock investment, because the market is regulated, they offer greater reassurance for cryptocurrency investors. We also wanted to diversify the assets available on the platform to attract new investors who are interested in yielding returns with Real World Assets.”

The assets on Forge are called fAssets and can be forged and burned in the Ovens by anyone. As standard ERC-Tokens, assets can only be minted against collateral deposits. Traders can begin by opening an oven using USDC as collateral for the creation of synthetic assets. The crypto trader may then burn the fAssets minted by closing the oven, and they will be able to recover the collateral that has been locked.

Forge.SX is supported by a reliable Oracle data feed that connects the world of Blockchain to the Forge.SX platform. A competent and experienced team is also available at the company, with a strong background in Dapp development and DeFi. In order to provide traders with the best service in the industry, Forge.SX consistently performs research and development. Core Forgers said: “We do our finest to bring safety and value to our investors and remain transparent to inspire confidence in our business model and the future of synthetic assets.”

To learn more about Forge or to start trading real-world assets such as stocks on Forge SX, please visit: https://forge.sx/

Investors Flock as Lyfebloc Token Presale Starting Soon 2482

As investors seek out emerging opportunities, pre-sales are becoming more common, causing the crypto market to explode. One token that is making waves lately is Lyfebloc, which has raised a lot of interest in its upcoming presale in the world of DeFi (Decentralized Finance).

About Lyfebloc

Lyfebloc a next generation Automated Marker Maker (AMM) that provides frictionless crypto liquidity. With Decentralized Governance and cross chain liquidity, Lyfebloc transcends the barriers that currently isolate constant function market makers. Combined with sophisticated routing and arbitrage design, Lyfebloc expands the design space for trading and market making on-chain.

Key features of Lyfebloc (LBT):

  • Automated Market Maker (AMM): Designed with next generation arbitrage design enables users to Optimize your trades across hundreds of DEXes on multiple networks instantly
  • Liquidity Aggregation Protocol: Instantly sources liquidity from multiple hundreds of sources to provide lowest slippage and best price trades.
  • Yield Farming: Allows users to earn rewards by staking LP tokens. LP tokens are generated by the fees charged when users trade on the Lyfebloc, and these tokens can be staked to earn LBT rewards.
  • Multiplier Protocol: Allows users to trade crypto with zero price impact, up to 100x leverage and aggregated liquidity.
  • Governance: Governed by the community through Lyfebloc DAO, a Decentralized Autonomous Organization. LBT holders stake LBT tokens to vote on governance proposals that shape Lyfebloc.
  • Deflationary Protocol: generates decentralized financial assets that reward users with sustainable fixed compound interest models while awarding token holders in crypto.

Why is it being touted as such a revolutionary crypto project?

Lyfebloc offers a range of real-world use cases, including liquidity pools, yield farming, lending, and borrowing. It’s also built on the Ethereum blockchain, which offers fast transaction speeds and low fees, making it a more practical option for DeFi users. Additionally, Lyfebloc also has a more comprehensive ecosystem than most cryptocurrency projects on the market, with a range of products that work together seamlessly. This makes it a more attractive option for DeFi users who are looking for a one-stop shop for all their DeFi needs.

Conclusion

Lyfebloc (LBT) is a DeFi token that’s set to make waves in the crypto market. With its unique architecture, comprehensive ecosystem, and real-world use cases, it’s being touted as a revolutionary crypto project. Lyfebloc has already raised the interest of the biggest names in the crypto industry for its upcoming presale, which is a testament to its potential.

While it’s still early days for Lyfebloc, the project has a solid development team, a range of products, and a clear roadmap for the future. As DeFi continues to gain mainstream acceptance, Lyfebloc is well-positioned to be a major player in the space.

Visit the links below for more information about Lyfebloc (LBT) token presale:
Lyfebloc Presale: Lyfebloc Presale
Lyfebloc: https://lyfebloc.com
Lyfebloc Network: https://lyfeblocnetwork.com